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This note describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor markets
for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, and the market for post-season
college football bowls. Together these will illustrate that unraveling can occur in markets with competitive
prices, that it can result in substantial inefficiencies, and that marketplace institutions play a role in
restoring efficiency.  I’ll conclude with open questions about the role of marketplace institutions and
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Abstract: This note describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including 
the labor markets for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, 
and  the  market  for  post-season  college  football  bowls.  Together  these  will  illustrate  that 
unraveling  can  occur  in  markets  with  competitive  prices,  that  it  can  result  in  substantial 
inefficiencies, and that marketplace institutions play a role in restoring efficiency. (All of these 
contradict the conclusions of Priest, 2010). I’ll conclude with open questions about the role of 
marketplace institutions and the timing of transactions. 
 
  1. Introduction 
This note is, first, a response to Priest’s (2010) paper, “Timing ‘Disturbances’ in Labor Market 
Contracting: Roth’s Findings and the Effects of Labor Market Monopsony.”  Priest writes to 
rebut what he describes as “The work of Alvin E. Roth and colleagues writing in what might be 
described as the Roth tradition”
2 about “a curious set of phenomena in some labor and product 
markets.”  
This note also provides a brief description of phenomena concerning the timing of transactions, 
and the labor market institutions that have evolved or been designed to deal with them. I will 
conclude with some open problems concerning how marketplaces deal with issues of timing, 
both in labor markets and other kinds of markets. 
 Briefly, the “tradition” Priest addresses has studied the timing of transactions, and observed 
that some markets go through episodes in which they unravel in time, with transactions 
becoming earlier and more diffuse in time from year to year, and with offers often coming to 
have very short durations (“exploding” offers). This has often led to changes in marketplace 
institutions, to introduce a uniform time for market transactions, to restore thickness to the 
market. Frequently this involves facilitating a marketplace at a later as well as a more uniform 
time. (For overviews, see Roth and Xing 1994, and Niederle and Roth 2009.) 
                                                           
1 Department of Economics, Harvard University, and Harvard Business School, aroth@hbs.edu.  
I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Christine Jolls and Muriel Niederle, and support from the National 
Science Foundation. 
2 Emphasis added, but a search reveals that the name “Roth” shows up 78 times in Priest (2010). 2 
 
Priest claims timing problems arise only when prices cannot adjust freely, and that timing 
problems do not arise in markets with adjustable prices:  
“Time-of-contracting “problems” could be eliminated…by removing the monopsony or 
monopoly conditions and allowing price to serve as the market clearing mechanism.” 
(Priest, 2010, p450)  
I will explain why in fact it seems likely that there are many different causes of unraveling, some 
of which apply no matter how freely prices are adjustable. And I’ll describe unraveling in 
markets in which prices adjust freely, to explain why Priest’s claim is empirically false.  
For example, Priest contrasts the market for law graduates who seek judicial clerkships, a 
market which has had serious timing problems and in which wages are set by Congress, with 
the market for law students seeking jobs with law firms, which he claims has not experienced 
timing problems.  Specifically, Priest (2010, p453) says:  
“…scholars in the Roth tradition have not explained why there is a troublesome 
acceleration of offers with respect to the market for medical residents and 
federal judicial clerks, but not apparently with regard to other postgraduate 
labor markets, say, for the markets for law students not choosing to clerk…” 
 
But, as I will discuss in the next section, this characterization of the larger law market is 
incorrect: the market for entry level positions in large law firms has persistently experienced 
episodes of unraveling, and over several decades the legal community has attempted to 
establish marketplace institutions and rules to control this unraveling, with only limited success. 
(For an account of unraveling in the non-clerk law market, see Roth and Xing (1994), which is 
brought up to date below.  For an account of unraveling in the clerkship markets, see Roth and 
Xing (1994) and Avery, Jolls, Posner and Roth (2001, 2007)).) 
This reply will have three main parts in addition to this introduction, each with copious 
supporting references to relevant empirical observations (often from the “tradition” Priest 
criticizes). Section 2 briefly describes unraveling in three markets: the market for new hires by 
law firms, the market for post-season college football bowls, and the market for new hires in 
gastroenterology.  These will illustrate that unraveling can occur in markets with competitive 
prices, and that it can result in substantial inefficiencies. 
Section 3 further indicates where Priest’s other specific predictions, descriptions, and 
conclusions are contradicted by the evidence, and why his conclusions about the timing of 
transactions do not follow at all from his model (in which time is not modeled at all). More 
productively, section 4 describes some of the many unanswered questions associated with the 
study of the timing of transactions, and the role and design of marketplaces. 3 
 
To foreshadow the open questions, a great deal is still unknown about how labor markets and 
other matching processes clear, and the role that marketplace institutions play. We understand 
much more about how price clears markets for simple commodities. And even competitive 
commodity markets develop institutions related to the timing of transactions (such as the 
opening and closing times of the NY Stock Exchange), intended to foster a thick market. But in 
lots of markets, unlike commodity markets, you can’t simply choose what you want, even if you 
can afford it, you also have to be chosen. Thus prices seem to play a different role in clearing 
“matching markets” than in markets for commodities.  
For example, colleges don’t raise tuition until exactly enough applicants remain to fill the 
available places, nor do universities lower the wage of assistant professors until just enough 
remain. Instead, there’s courtship on both sides; not only do students have to apply to selective 
colleges, but colleges have to woo their admitted students, who are also admitted to other 
colleges, and similarly for highly skilled professionals and the firms from which they seek 
employment and which seek to employ them. This can take time; time for interviews and offers 
and visits and negotiations, and acceptances and rejections. Consequently these markets can 
experience congestion (cf. Roth and Xing 1997), when participants find they have insufficient 
time to evaluate the different possible transactions they face. So the marketplace institutions 
and practices that mediate these “matching markets” must address the fact that transactions 
are time consuming.  
The emerging research tradition that seeks to understand how marketplaces deal with these 
issues and many others, and sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, and can sometimes be 
fixed when they are broken, is called market design (cf. Roth 2002a, 2008a). 
2. Introduction to unraveling 
  Hiring by large law firms: 
 
A July 2010 announcement from Northwestern University School of Law gives a clue that there 
presently is unraveling in the market for new lawyers seeking employment in law firms, and 
efforts are being made to resist it (see also Rampell 2010). The announcement begins: 
 
  “Northwestern University School of Law and the global law firm Jones 
Day announced today July 26 that the firm will conduct its on-campus interviews 
for 2011 summer associates in September instead of during the law school's 
official on-campus interviewing (OCI) program, which begins Aug. 11. … 
  “Jones Day joins Northwestern Law in the belief that the current 
recruitment system has created a competitive race among law schools and law 
firms to conduct on-campus interviews earlier. The result is an inefficient system 
that does not serve employers or student applicants well, according to the law 4 
 
school and law firm. ”
3 (emphasis added) 
 
The announcement refers to the 2010 interviewing and hiring of summer associates for the 
summer of 2011, after they will have finished only their second year of law school. That is, the 
movement to earlier interview dates means that the competition to find summer employment 
and summer employees for the summer after the second year of law school has now moved a 
year in advance, to the summer after the first year. This unraveling of interview dates is what 
Northwestern and Jones Day are trying to halt or reverse by delaying interviewing until 
September. 
 
Why are summer hires important? Because at the biggest law firms, much of the hiring of full 
time associates, who join the firm after the completion of their third year of law school, has 
unraveled into the summer associate market; i.e. the competition for summer associates is 
fierce because summer associates largely become full time employees. According to the NALP 
(formerly known as the National Association for Law Placement), this has been only somewhat 
eroded by the recent financial crisis: in 2009, large firms offered 69% of summer interns a full-
time job, down from about 90% in 2004-8, but with a corresponding increase of acceptances to 
about 85%, up from the high 70’s (NALP, 2010a).  With the unraveling of interviews for summer 
associate positions, this means that much of the hiring of law school graduates by big law firms 
has moved to the summer after their first year of law school, two years before they will begin 
full time employment. 
 
Why might this possibly be inefficient? There are many possibilities (of which more below), but 
one that was made starkly clear by the recent economic crisis (which reduced demand for 
outside legal services) is that hiring more than a year before the start of employment makes it 
difficult for firms to forecast their demand. For example, thousands of the summer associates 
at large firms  who accepted permanent offers shortly after their second year summer 
associateships in August 2008 (for permanent jobs in 2009), had them rescinded or deferred. 
The NALP reports: 
 
“From the employer perspective, over half of the summer 2008 associates (class 
of 2009 graduates) accounted for in the survey were deferred beyond December 
1, 2009. While it is impossible to determine the exact number of associates 
whose start dates were deferred, analyses of the survey data from law schools 
and law firms suggests that the number was at least 3,200 and could be as high 
as 3,700.” NALP (2010b). 
 
That is, after being recruited two years in advance of employment, and accepting a position one 
year in advance of employment, and therefore declining or not searching for other 
opportunities, thousands of lawyers graduated in June 2009 only to be told that the position 
they had accepted was not available. And some of the law firms, to maintain their reputation 
and their relationships, paid the deferred employees a part of what would have been their 
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starting salary and encouraged them to spend a year doing pro bono work (see e.g. Petak, 
2010).  
 
Roth and Xing (1994) note that firms similarly withdrew positions from law graduates in 1991, 
following unraveling in the 1980’s that sometimes resulted in hiring as much as a year earlier 
than we are presently seeing:   
“by the middle of the 1980's the unraveling of recruiting had proceeded to such 
an extent that some students were being offered summer associate positions 
before they had matriculated at law school.” (Roth and Xing 1994, p1005).    
 
Then, as now, there was considerable concern that many of these early offers were also 
exploding offers. In an attempt to regulate the market, the NALP, formed in 1971, issued 
regulations intended to govern the timing and duration of offers by law firms.
4  For instance, 
one of the regulations adopted in 1988 specified that offers should remain open for at least two 
weeks, and others specified dates until which offers should remain open. But Roth and Xing 
(1994, p1007) note that  
“some law firms began to give offers which met the letter of *these regulations+, 
but which structured the compensation so that the offer was competitive 
because it included a ‘signing bonus’ which could only be collected if the offer 
was accepted much more promptly.” 
 
In response to such strategic behavior, the NALP rules have been modified repeatedly, in 1985, 
1988, 1992, 1994, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009, and 2010. The 2010 rules (NALP 2010c), in the 
section “General Standards for the Timing of Offers and Decisions” include several variations on 
the following (some of which specify 28 days instead of two weeks, for different categories of 
candidates, e.g. first year students). 
“All offers to law student candidates (“candidates”) should remain open for at 
least two weeks after the date of the offer letter…” 
 
Other regulations specify times before which offers should not be made:  
“Prospective employers and first year law students should not initiate contact 
with one another and employers should not interview or make offers to first 
year students before December 1.” 
 
An accompanying document called “Interpretations” (NALP 2010d) includes 
Q. May employers offer signing bonuses that decline or evaporate according to the date 
of acceptance of the offer of employment?  
                                                           
4 The preamble to the NALP rules includes the following ( http://www.nalp.org/principles, emphasis added):  
  “NALP's Principles & Standards are guidelines that offer an ethical framework for all participants in law 
student recruiting. They guide the timing of responses to offers and set forth the obligations of all participants in 
the recruiting process. Compliance with the Principles is voluntary, yet virtually all ABA-accredited law schools and 
many of the nation's legal employers subscribe to these guidelines. 
  “NALP also offers interpretations of the Principles that provide guidance for dealing with specific difficult 
recruiting situations, such as signing bonuses, exploding offers, establishing a waiting list, and first year recruiting.”  6 
 
 
A. This type of signing bonus violates the letter and spirit of the Principles & 
Standards…. Signing bonuses or other benefits that require a decision in advance of the 
dates in Part V or that vary according to the date of acceptance are considered special 
inducements and violate this provision. 
  
The history of these regulations and the frequent adjustments to them reflects a market in 
which many participants have great respect for obeying the “letter of the law,” but devote 
considerable ingenuity to circumventing its spirit. 
 
 In summary, both local (campus recruiting) and national (NALP) marketplace institutions have 
developed to try to coordinate the market, and regulate and contain unraveling of the market 
for law graduates going to law firms. However, the conclusions of Roth and Xing (1994, p1007) 
about this market still seem timely (emphasis added): 
“Thus in the market for new associates, particularly new associates in the largest 
law firms, attempts to halt the unraveling of recruiting and of appointment dates 
have been unsuccessful, as have attempts to establish uniform dates (however 
early) for recruiting and hiring. Thus the problems of unraveling are not confined 
to markets in which salaries cannot be easily adjusted to help clear the market.” 
 
  The market for post-season college football bowls: 
 
In many markets it is difficult or impossible to quantify the effects of unraveling on efficiency, 
because it is hard to measure the output of the market (and hence difficult to draw conclusions, 
for example, about how unraveling in the markets for law graduates affects the production of 
justice). So it is useful to look at unraveling in markets in which efficiency losses can be 
measured. The market for post-season college football games provides such an opportunity. 
 
Briefly, college football teams play each other on weekends throughout the Fall, and college 
bowls are businesses that operate stadiums that each host a post-season game between two 
teams that had successful seasons.  Roth and Xing (1994) note 
“The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) tried for a number of years 
to prevent unraveling of the dates at which bowls and teams finalized 
agreements about which teams would play in which bowls. However it gave up 
in failure following the 1990-91 football season.”   
 
The costs of unraveling in this market are connected to the fact that if two teams are matched 
to play a postseason game before they have finished the regular season, it is possible that one 
or both will lose some of their remaining regular season games, making the postseason game 
less attractive than it would have been if it had featured more successful teams. 
Starting in 1992, and subject to many subsequent modifications, various consortia of bowls and 
football conferences (called the Bowl Coalition, the Bowl Alliance, and the Bowl Championship 7 
 
Series) have tried to increase the probability of good matchings of teams, by making the market 
thicker (including more teams and bowls in the pool from which matches can be made), and 
delaying the determination of matchings until after the regular season games have all been 
concluded. Fréchette, Roth, and Ünver (2007) point out that, if we take television viewership to 
be a reasonable proxy for what this industry produces, unraveling produced very inefficient 
matches, compared to those that have been achieved when the market was thicker and later. 




Television viewership dropped as the market unraveled prior to 1992, but picked up again after 
unraveling was reversed and the market was gradually made thicker, and more “championship” 
games were produced. Details are in Fréchette, Roth, and Ünver (2007), who conclude that the 
reorganization of the football bowl market increased efficiency by delaying the market so that it 
could operate after end of regular season rankings were known, allowing matches to be made 
among the highest ranked teams.  
 
  The market for gastroenterologists 
                                                           
5 The figure shows the average Nielsen ratings per year in the BCS Bowls, normalized by subtracting the average 
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Unraveling can have profound effects on who matches with whom. A market that illustrates 
this clearly is the labor market for gastroenterology fellows (a position that is open to board 
certified internists who wish to pursue gastroenterology as a subspecialty). After experiencing 
unraveling similar to that for other entry-level medical positions (cf. Roth 1984, 2003, Harner et 
al. 2008), the market for gastroenterology fellows employed a centralized labor market 
clearinghouse, a “match,” starting in 1986. But starting after a shock to the market in 1996 (see 
McKinney, Niederle and Roth 2005), fellowship directors and potential fellows started to reach 
agreements before the match, and over the next few years the market unraveled. One 
consequence of this is that what had previously been a national market broke apart into much 
more regional markets, as fellows became much less likely to change hospitals, cities, or states 
when they moved from their internal medicine position to their gastroenterology fellowship. 
The figure below, from Niederle and Roth (2003), gives an indication of this effect of unraveling 
on the market. Unraveling affected not only the timing of the market, but also narrowed its 
scope. (Since 2006, the gastroenterology fellowship market has successfully reinstituted a 
match, which required an intervention to make exploding offers less common, see Niederle and 
Roth 2004, 2005a,b, 2009a,b, and Niederle, Proctor and Roth 2006, 2008). 
 
Share of mobility of gastroenterology fellows for each year. The vertical lines indicate the beginning and the end of the use of the centralized 




These examples of markets that have experienced unraveling show that unraveling occurs even 
in markets with adjustable prices, and it happens even in cases when the outcome is inefficient. 
 
Even these three examples start to suggest that unraveling takes place in different kinds of 
markets, seemingly for different reasons.  I’ve argued elsewhere that unraveling can have many 
causes, because markets are highly multidimensional and time is only one dimensional (and so 
transactions can only move in two directions in time, earlier or later). So there can be many 9 
 




After discussing several different causes of unraveling, Roth and Xing (1994, p1038) put it this 
way:  
“We do not claim that these are the only causes of unraveling. On the contrary, 
unraveling seems to occur in a sufficiently wide range of markets so that it is 
likely that there are many causes.”  
 
 
 Priest (2010), in contrast, claims that unraveling has a single cause, rigid prices. He further 
claims (see below) that dealing with unraveling and its effects consequently requires no 
marketplace regulations or institutions. 
 
3. Reply to Priest 
As indicated above, Priest makes three principal claims (Priest, 2010, p450): 
1.  “This paper will attempt to demonstrate that the source of the early contracting 
phenomena in labor markets is labor market monopsony; in product markets, 
monopoly.”  
2.  “It is an implication of this demonstration that the proposals of those in the Roth 
tradition to introduce engineered matching programs to solve the purported ‘market 
failure’ serve, in fact, to shore up the monopsonies or monopolies that generate the 
problem.” 
3.  “Time of contracting ‘problems’ could be eliminated—and in many other labor and 
product markets are eliminated--by removing the monopsony or monopoly conditions 
and allowing price to serve as the market clearing mechanism.” 
 
Priest also presents a theoretical argument that he believes supports these claims, and I turn 
next to that, before continuing from the previous section the discussion of the empirical 
evidence. 
Priest’s basic model is a set of intersecting supply and demand curves to illustrate that if prices 
aren’t personal (e.g. if, as in the market for judicial clerks, all clerks for all judges receive the 
same wage), but if workers and employers are heterogeneous, then the fixed prices won’t clear 
the market in the sense that they don’t make workers indifferent between different employers 
or employers indifferent between different workers.  
                                                           
6 There can also be strategic reasons to delay transactions; see e.g. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) and Ockenfels and 
Roth (2006) on late bidding in internet auctions, and the experiment of Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth (2005). 10 
 
From this observation, he makes a verbal leap to conclude that judges will make early offers, 
unraveling will result, and that this will restore efficiency.
7 I call this a “verbal” leap because 
time nowhere enters into Priest’s static model. Why will early contracting and not late 
contracting be the response to this inefficiency?
8 Or why wouldn’t judges simply make offers to 
the applicants they like best? Or to those who like them best? Priest’s model is completely 
silent on how agents might respond to inefficiencies caused by fixed prices, because his model 
doesn’t include actions of any kind. Neither does it include time in any way, neither as an action 
(e.g. to hire earlier or later), nor as a factor in when information is revealed, etc. 
Note that the literature contains a number of models of early contracting. Priest cites one, by Li 
and Rosen (1998), but he is apparently unaware that the conclusions of that model contradict 
his own. Li and Rosen study early contracting that arises as insurance against future states of 
the world, at equilibrium in a fully competitive model, with freely adjustable prices. (Their 
model, of course, unlike Priest’s, includes both an early and a late period, and allows employers 
to decide when to make offers, and workers to decide whether to accept them, and considers 
an equilibrium of the resulting game.) There are a variety of illuminating models of early 
contracting and unraveling, with and without adjustable prices.
9 These models reflect some of 
the diversity of the causes of unraveling and early contracting that we also see in the world. See 
for example Damiano and Suen (2005), Fainmesser (2010), Halaburda (2010), and Li and Suen 
(2000, 2004).
10 
Even a claim without theoretical support could have empirical content, so let us now return to 
the evidence. Priest supports his conclusions with the closely related claim that unraveling does 
not occur except in monopolistic markets, and names several markets which he asserts are free 
of unraveling including  
“MBA’s, other graduating professionals, or for that matter, college or high school 
graduates, where early contracting has not been observed” (Priest, 2010, p450);  
and,  
                                                           
7 E.g. Priest, p459: “Figure 3 also explains why judges and students accelerate the hiring process. As drawn, some 
students with ability represented on the MRPL1 curve would accept an offer from a judge whose nonwage benefits 
equaled only wb but of course would prefer an offer from a wa judge.” 
8 Indeed, while most judges seem to be trying to hire law students earlier, there is a still small but growing number 
of judges who are hiring later, by hiring law graduates instead of current law students (see Sloan, 2010). 
9 The distinction between models of simple early contracting versus unraveling in all its detail is a useful one, since 
models such as Li and Rosen look at early and late markets that are both thick and competitive, i.e. without 
exploding offers or diffuse timing that makes some decisions occur in thin markets. 
10 There are also models of price compression due to impersonal prices; see Kamecke (1998) and Bulow and Levin 
(2006), both proposed as models of the resident match, although Kojima (2007) and Niederle (2007) subsequently 
point out that Bulow and Levin’s conclusions are tied to parts of their model (one resident per hospital and no 
possibility of personal prices, respectively) that do not fit the actual medical match, which presently uses a 
clearinghouse algorithm designed by Roth and Peranson (1999). See also Azevedo (2010) for a different approach. 11 
 
“the markets for law students not choosing to clerk,” (Priest, 2010, p453). 
Priest, a law professor, uses this latter market as his central example that unraveling can’t 
happen in competitive markets, writing 
“Given the large number of competing law firms within any state, it is 
implausible that law firm salaries are set oligopsonistically but instead represent 
competitive market salaries for new law graduates.” (Priest, 2010, p464) 
So Priest’s claim that there is no unraveling in the market for new hires by law firms provides 
what he counts as an important demonstration of his conclusion that unraveling doesn’t occur 
in competitive markets, and that prices alone clear such markets without intervening 
marketplace institutions. 
But as the previous section shows, the evidence from the law firm market makes it impossible to 
maintain that the market for law students going to law firms hasn’t experienced unraveling, or 
that the result is always efficient, or that marketplace regulations and institutions haven’t been 
formulated to deal with unraveling and its effects, despite the fact that wages are adjustable. 
(Recall in particular that the free adjustability of wages was even deployed in the form of time-
dependent signing bonuses to circumvent rules against making early exploding offers.)  
In this section, more briefly, I’ll point out that Priest’s claims are also not justified for the other 
markets he mentions, each of which has experienced at least some episodes of unraveling. 
Let’s begin with high school graduates, many of whom are interested in going to college (a 
market that involves both variable announced prices and personalized discounts in the form of 
financial aid). The organization of colleges and high schools that tries to regulate the timing of 
transactions in this market is the National Association for College Admission Counseling, NACAC 
(http://www.nacacnet.org/).
11 These regulations accommodate the fact that many selective 
colleges now make the functional equivalent of early exploding offers through binding “Early 
Decision” programs that allow a student to apply to one school early by signing a contract to 
attend if admitted. Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser (2003) recount the growth of these 
programs, in which unraveling has taken the form not of offers made increasingly early, but of 
                                                           
11 NACAC (2009), the latest edition of their guidelines on timing, states that their member colleges agree to 
“3.permit first-year candidates for fall admission to choose among offers of admission, financial aid and 
scholarships until May 1 …; 4. not offer exclusive incentives that provide opportunities for students applying or 
admitted Early Decision that are not available to students admitted under other admission options;” and “12. not 
establish any application deadlines for first-year candidates for fall admission prior to October 15 and will give 
equal consideration to all applications received 
by that date.” 
 12 
 
increasing percentages of admissions made through early offers. (E.g. Cohen, 2010 reports that 
last year Columbia University filled 59% of its seats through early admission.) 
Note that college graduates seeking to go to graduate school (and the universities that seek to 
attract them) also work under rules concerning the timing of transactions promulgated by the 
Council of Graduate Schools, that set an April 15 deadline before which offers of financial aid 
should not explode (see McKinney et al. 2005). 
Turning to MBA’s, whose markets appear to have experienced only modest unraveling, efforts 
to regulate the timing of recruitment, duration of offers, etc., mostly seem to be made in a 
decentralized way by campus recruitment offices. Roth and Xing (1994) say 
“The top MBA graduates from the most prestigious Business schools have for 
some years been regarded as attractive recruits for a variety of businesses. The 
most aggressive firms (e.g. consulting firms in the 1970's, and investment 
banking firms in the 1980's) have periodically engaged in early offers with short 
fuses. (Margaret Neale and Max Bazerman, 1991, p123 also describe a variation 
on exploding offers in which the offered salary goes down for every day that the 
candidate delays accepting.) Although we are not aware of any attempt to 
organize a market-wide response to such practices, the deans of particular 
business schools whose students are the subject of such offers have sometimes 
responded with threats to deny the offending firms easy access to their 
graduates, typically by denying them on-campus recruiting facilities.” 
 
Readers on campuses with business schools should have no difficulty verifying that these 
concerns have cropped up repeatedly since then, at times of high demand. Similarly, 
undergraduate recruiting offices attempt, not always successfully, to discourage early exploding 
offers from consulting firms and investment banks who seek to compete in this way (as well as 
with wages) both with each other and with other sorts of firms. 
  
 Priest also takes up the discussion of medieval markets in Roth and Xing (1994) and argues that 
timing regulations there could not have had efficiency implications. While we can no longer 
directly observe medieval markets, readers who go to farmers’ markets today may note that (as 
in the one near my house) they begin at a fixed time (sometimes marked by the ringing of a 
bell), and that sellers will hesitate to transact beforehand, and will meet with the disapproval of 
their neighbors should they attempt to. The issue seems to be that, if the vendors transact 
before the market bell, then some of them will start to set up their stalls earlier, some 
customers will come earlier, and an afternoon market could quickly unravel to become an all 
day market, requiring the vendors to devote more time to selling in a thinner market.
12 
                                                           
12 At least in the market near my house, there are no King’s men present to collect taxes, and some of the vendors 
operate on a cash basis with no cash registers or receipts, so it does not appear that a uniform starting time 
facilitates tax collection. 13 
 
In addition to asserting, incorrectly, that unraveling does not occur in markets with adjustable 
prices (like the market for new hires by law firms), Priest (2010) also describes at some length 
the unraveling in the market for medical residents. I will simply note that, in places critical to his 
argument, this description also is incorrect.   
For example, Priest (2010, p449) describes the resident match introduced in the 1950’s as “a 
mandatory matching program” (emphasis added). A more accurate description would be 
“voluntary.” (E.g. Mullen, 1950, spoke of trying to establish a “moral commitment” to 
participate, saying: “It would be impossible, as well as undesirable, to set up a central office 
with legal authority to assign interns to hospitals. It is not at all within the compass of this plan 
to force such developments.”)  In more recent years, as participation in medical labor market 
clearinghouses has become well established, rules have been written that have a more 
“mandatory” tone to them, but as I described above concerning the defection from the 
Gastroenterology match, there is in fact no mandatory element, in the sense that when 
participants wish to transact outside of a match they can. What does seem to be the case is 
that when a well designed centralized clearinghouse attracts sufficient participation, it becomes 
an equilibrium to participate.  
But the distinction between voluntary and mandatory market mechanisms is important to 
Priest’s argument, since he asserts that any voluntary arrangements that are observed (such as 
unraveling) must be optimal.
13 Of course this is not correct: one need only think of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, or the general problems of efficiently providing public goods.
14  
In particular, voluntary participation in medical labor market clearinghouses has occurred 
without visibly changing wages. (Niederle and Roth 2003 compare wages of specialties that use 
a match with similar specialties that don’t.) So the success of these clearinghouses at halting 
and reversing unraveling shows that the question of whether a market unravels is more 
complicated than how its wages adjust. The market for gastroenterologists unraveled despite 
having a clearinghouse, while other internal medicine specialties continued to use centralized 
clearinghouses. So, even if wages play a role in unraveling, they interact with other aspects of 
the market, and with marketplace institutions. 
                                                           
13 E.g. Priest, p454: “the only market test of the optimal acquisition of information is when the information 
available is sufficient to lead the parties to enter the transaction.” 
14 Another point on which one could question Priest’s description is that the medical market, with its thousands of 
employers, is monopsonistic. (Priest addresses that issue this way (p450): “Because some of the examples given 
include multiple employers, one might describe these markets as oligopsonies though, as we shall see, their 
operation differs very little from pure monopsony.” As it happens, a medical market that more closely resembles 
the market for law clerks in having centrally administered prices is found in the U.K., see e.g. Roth (1990, 1991) and 
Unver (2001). 14 
 
Priest also claims (p467) that the matching program “eliminates the possibility” for hospitals to 
offer higher wages. I don’t think this is at all correct, and I think it reflects a misunderstanding 
about why e.g. rural hospitals that have difficulty hiring residents (Roth, 1986) don’t hire away 
the residents of more attractive hospitals by raising their wages. In fact it may be easier for 
these hospitals to hire licensed physicians, in much the same way that a college without a 
graduate program hires assistant professors rather than trying to compete with Yale for 
graduate students by offering higher graduate stipends—the long term career benefits of being 
at a top hospital or graduate program make it cheaper for employers who can’t compete on 
those dimensions to hire people at a later stage in their careers. 
Priest also devotes considerable space to making comparable-worth arguments about doctors 
and lawyers (without noting that doctors are not eligible for licensing immediately after 
graduation, or other differences between the two markets such as the considerable barriers to 
entry to medicine and medical specialties).
15 And Priest’s claim that lawyer salaries are much 
more widely dispersed than resident salaries seems misleadingly disingenuous in view of the 
very narrow range of salaries paid to new hires by the largest law firms.
 16 
Finally, Priest claims that unraveling restores efficiency, but there is no evidence of this, and 
considerable evidence that unraveling has persisted in markets in which it is inefficient. In 
section 2 I discussed this in connection with the market for post-season college football bowls. 
This is a question that can also be examined in the laboratory, and numerous experiments show 
that unraveling can occur even when it is inefficient (see e.g. Kagel and Roth 2001, McKinney et 
al. 2005, Haruvy, Roth and Unver 2006, and Niederle and Roth 2009). This is not to say that 
unraveling may not be more efficient than some alternatives: Kagel and Roth (2001) look at a 
congested matching environment in which unraveling improves efficiency, but not as much as a 
clearinghouse that solves the congestion problem. 
                                                           
15 I am reminded of the similar arguments made when, in 2002, 16 law firms filed a class action law suit, 
representing 3 former residents seeking to represent all residents and fellows, arguing that the NRMP violated 
antitrust laws and was a conspiracy to depress wages.  The suit was in fact a double class action suit that sought 
not only to represent a class of plaintiffs, but to name as defendants the class of all hospitals that employed them. 
Adopting a legal strategy that seemed designed to get a pre-trial financial settlement, the suit named 29 hospitals 
(in 16 states), and 7 medical organizations, including the NRMP. Thus the defense costs involved assembling law 
firms representing all these named defendants, and threatened to mount very quickly. However the strategy of 
naming so many defendants also opened the door to legislative relief, and President Bush signed into law the 
Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, which included as an addendum a clause that the resident match could be 
regarded as a marketplace, and not a per se violation of the antitrust laws, so that a suit against the match would 
have to show actual violations of the law to proceed. The suit was subsequently dismissed.  
16 E.g. Roth and Xing (1994) note “The very highest salaries of all are paid by the largest New York firms, which in 
1990 paid a median starting salary to new graduates of $83,000. And the competitiveness of this market is 
reflected in the fact that the interquartile range (25th to 75th percentiles) of these salaries was only $1,000 (NALP, 
1991, p52).” Recent NALP salary reports note that, for the Class of 2009, “salaries of $160,000 accounted for 25% 
of reported salaries.” (http://www.nalp.org/salarydistrib ) 15 
 
To summarize, Priest is certainly correct that, in some of the markets that have experienced 
unraveling, there isn’t a price adjustment mechanism.
17  However it is incorrect to conclude 
from this, as Priest does, that rigid prices are the cause of unraveling (let alone the only cause), 
or that unraveling is efficient, or that it doesn’t occur in markets with adjustable prices. In fact, 
there are markets with freely adjustable wages that have experienced persistent unraveling 
(like the market for new hires by large law firms), and markets with relatively inflexible wages in 
which unraveling does not occur (like the labor markets for new doctors that employ 
clearinghouses that produce stable matchings, cf. Roth 2008b). Thus all of Priest’s claims about 
unraveling are falsified by the evidence. 
Instead, there are many open questions about unraveling, the timing of transactions generally, 
and the marketplace institutions that have evolved or been designed to help coordinate 
transactions in matching markets. 
3.  Open Questions:   
The unraveling of markets, and the development of marketplace rules and institutions in 
response raise a number of very general questions of a sort that economists haven’t 
systematically asked or answered. What are the roles of marketplaces in markets? What 
properties of transactions, aside from price, do marketplaces help determine?  These questions 
become more focused when we consider labor markets. 
Specifically, what factors make a market prone to unraveling? Which markets are adequately 
organized without a coordinated marketplace (coordinated in time, or space, or both)? For 
which markets is a centralized marketplace desirable? For which markets does a centralized 
clearinghouse (possibly computer-assisted) offer additional benefits? 
Centralized clearinghouses of the kind that now organize many entry level medical labor 
markets largely arose in response to unraveling.
18 But clearinghouses have also been designed 
to fix different kinds of market failure, e.g. to help make markets thick when thickness is absent 
for other reasons than unraveling, or deal with congestion, or to structure incentives so as to 
make the marketplace safe to participate in.
19 And other kinds of market institutions than 
                                                           
17 In addition to law clerks, he might have added the recruiting activities of American college fraternities and 
sororities, which are called rush, in an etymology that comes from unraveling; see Mongell and Roth (1991). 
18 The successful clearinghouses have primarily been those that produce stable matchings in the sense of Gale and 
Shapley (1962). Many questions remain about how decentralized markets succeed or fail in producing stable 
matchings, and the relationship of stable matchings to market clearing prices (cf. Kelso and Crawford 1982, 
Niederle and Yariv, 2010; Hatfield and Milgrom 2005; Kominers et al. 2010). 
19 Kidney exchange is a case where making a thick market (and then dealing with subsequent congestion) were the 
initial impetuses behind the development of clearinghouses, see Roth, Sonmez, and Unver (2004, 2005a,b, 2007) 
and Saidman et al. 2006, Roth et al. 2006, and Rees et al. 2009. School choice for high schools in NYC adopted a 16 
 
clearinghouses  have developed in response to unraveling (such as the application of rules and 
procedures to decentralized markets like the market for new hires by law firms). Signaling 
mechanisms are another example of an institution adopted to ease congestion in decentralized 
markets (such as the mechanism recently instituted by the American Economic Association to 
ease congestion in the annual marketplace for interviewing new Ph.D. economists, see Coles et 
al. 2010).
20 
 Understanding what well-designed centralized clearinghouses can contribute will involve 
understanding better how decentralized matching markets succeed and fail. Why do entry level 
labor markets for highly skilled professionals often seem to use personalized wages less than 
economic models sometimes suppose? E.g. as noted above, wages are surprisingly uniform 
even in the market for new hires by the largest law firms. 
 Unraveling typically involves offers that are not only early, but are dispersed in time, and short 
in duration (exploding). So, even when prices can move freely, unraveling can be a way for 
employers to create a small amount of monopoly power, by forcing workers to consider only 
one offer at a time. But whether this strategy will be successful depends in part on the “market 
culture” regarding how binding early offers are, e.g. on whether someone who has accepted an 
early exploding offer can later change his mind (Niederle and Roth 2009).
21  
In summary, smoothly functioning, efficient markets provide a kind of public good, so we 
shouldn’t be surprised if there is some free riding, for example by people who would like to 
transact just before the market opens. And marketplaces operate to facilitate market 
transactions, in ways that involve more than just prices. To help markets be competitive, 
marketplaces need to be safe enough to participate in so that the market becomes thick, and 
they need to be able to deal with the resulting congestion.  There is a lot still to be understood 
about what makes marketplaces work well, to allow us to better design new marketplaces 
where they are missing or broken. This calls for an empirically based research agenda—to make 
progress we’ll need to know a great deal about many different marketplace institutions and 
how they function in particular markets.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
centralized clearinghouse to deal with congestion (Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005, 2009), while in Boston the concern 
was making the marketplace safe to participate in (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 2003, Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2005). 
20 For more on signaling see Coles, Kushnir and Niederle (2010), or Lee and Niederle 2010, or Avery and Levin 
(2010) who analyze the signaling properties of early decision mechanisms in college admissions. 
21 I conjecture that this may be one of the reasons the market for new MBA’s has experienced only mild 
unraveling. Many MBA’s are employed in industries in which relationships can be broken with relatively short 
notice. That is, when firms can let employees go with only two weeks notice, and employees can likewise quit with 
little notice, the advantage of hiring a worker very early may be diminished, if it doesn’t allow the firm making an 
early offer to effectively “lock in” the worker, e.g. if he can continue looking for other options and give notice if he 
finds one he prefers. 17 
 
References:  
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila,  Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2005. “The New York City High School 
Match,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, (May): 364-367. 
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. “Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in 
Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match,” American Economic Review, 
99, 5 (December):  1954-1978. 
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez. 2005 “The Boston Public 
School Match,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, (May):  368-371. 
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sonmez. 2003. “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach,” 
American Economic Review, 93, Number 3, 1 (June): 729-747 
Ariely, Dan, Axel Ockenfels, and Alvin E. Roth. 2005. “An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in 
Internet Auctions,” Rand Journal of Economics, 36, 4, (Winter):  891-908. 
Avery, Christopher, Andrew Fairbanks and Richard J. Zeckhauser. 2003. “The Early Admissions Game: 
Joining the Elite,” Harvard University Press. 
Avery, Christopher, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth. 2001. “The Market for 
Federal Judicial Law Clerks”, University of Chicago Law Review, 68, 3, (Summer): 793-902. 
Avery, Christopher, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth. 2007.”The New Market for 
Federal Judicial Law Clerks”, University of Chicago Law Review, 74, (Spring): 447-486. 
Avery, Christopher and Jonathan Levin. 2010. “Early Admissions at Selective Colleges,” American 
Economic Review, 100(5), December. 
Azevedo, Eduardo M. 2010. “Imperfect Competition in Two-Sided Matching Markets,” working 
paper, Harvard University, 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~azevedo/papers/imperfect_competition_in_two_sided_matching_mark
ets.pdf  
Bulow, Jeremy and Jonathan Levin, Matching and Price Competition. 2006. American Economic 
Review, 96,3, (June): 652-668. 
Cohen, Steve. 2010. “Early Decision: College Admission’s Secret Handshake,” Forbes, 
http://blogs.forbes.com/stevecohen/2010/09/27/early-decision-college-admission%e2%80%99s-secret-
handshake/  
Coles, Peter, John H. Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and John J. Siegfried. 
2010. “The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective,” forthcoming, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, (Fall): Vol 24, Number 4 
Coles, Peter, Alexey Kushnir and Muriel Niederle, 2010. “Preference Signaling in Matching Markets”, 
working paper, Harvard Business School. 18 
 
Damiano, E., Li, H., and Suen, W. 2005. "Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting." The Review of Economic 
Studies 72: 1057-1076. 
Fainmesser, Itay, P. 2009. "Social Networks and Unraveling in Labor Markets,” working paper, 
Harvard University. 
Fréchette, Guillaume, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Ünver. 2007. “Unraveling Yields Inefficient 
Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls,” Rand Journal of Economics, 38, 4, 
(Winter): 967-982. 
Gale, David and Lloyd Shapley [1962], "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American 
Mathematical Monthly, 69, pp9-15.  
Halaburda, Hanna 2010. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences." 
Games and Economic Behavior 69, no. 2 , 365-393. 
Harner, Christopher D., Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. 
Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa, Serena S. Hu. 2008. "Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a 
universal match necessary? Is it possible?," Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery, 90, 1375-1384. 
Haruvy, Ernan, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Ünver. 2006. “The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An 
Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market,” Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 30, 3 , (March): 457-486. 
Hatfield, John W. and Paul Milgrom 2005. “Matching with Contracts,” American Economic Review,95, 
4, September, 913-935. 
Hatfield, John W., Scott D. Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander 
Westkamp, 2010. “Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks,” working paper. 
Kagel, John H. and A.E. Roth. 2000. "The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory 
experiment motivated by a natural experiment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (February): 201-235. 
Kamecke, Ulrich. 1998. "Wage Formation in a Centralized Matching Market," International Economic 
Review, 39, 1, (February): 33-53 
Kelso, Alexander S.,Jr. and Vincent P. Crawford [1982], "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and 
Gross Substitutes", Econometrica, 50, pp 1483-1504.  
Kojima, Fuhito. 2007. “Matching and Price Competition: Comment,” American Economic Review 97, 
1027-1031.   
Lee, Soohyung, and Muriel Niederle, 2010. “Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating 
Markets,”working paper. 
Li, H. and Rosen, S. 1998. "Unraveling in Matching Markets." American Economic Review 88: 371-
387. 19 
 
Li, H. and Suen, W. 2000. "Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting." Journal of Political Economy 
108: 1058-1091. 
Li, H. and Suen, W. 2004. "Self-Ful…lling Early-Contracting Rush." International Economic Review 45: 
301-324. 
McKinney, Nicholas C., Muriel Niederle, and Alvin E. Roth. 2005. “The collapse of a medical labor 
clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare),” American Economic Review, 95, 3, (June): 878-889.  
Mongell, S. and Roth, A.E. 1991. "Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism," American 
Economic Review, vol. 81, (June): 441-464. 
Mullin, F. J. 1950. “A Proposal for Supplementing the Cooperative Plan for Appointment of Interns.” 
J. Assoc. American Medical Colleges 25, no. 6, pt. 1 (November): 437-42. 
NACAC 2009. “Statement of Principles of Good Practice,” 
http://www.nacacnet.org/AboutNACAC/Policies/Documents/SPGP.pdf 
NALP. 2010. “Perspectives on Fall 2009 Law Student Recruiting,” 
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PerspectivesonFallRec09.pdf (a) 
NALP. 2010. “Entry-Level Recruiting Volumes Plunge, Some Start Dates Deferred,” 
http://www.nalp.org/2009perspectivesonfallrecruiting . (b) 
NALP. 2010. “Full Text of NALP Principles and Standards,” February 25, 
http://www.nalp.org/fulltextofnalpprinciplesandstandards  (c)  
NALP. 2010. “Principles & Standards Interpretations,” http://www.nalp.org/interpretations (d) 
 
Neale, Margaret A. and Bazerman, Max H. 1991. Cognition and rationality in negotiation. New York: 
Free Press. 
Niederle, Muriel. 2007. “Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts,” American 
Economic Review, 97, 5, (December): 1957 - 1969. 
Niederle, Muriel, Deborah D. Proctor, and Alvin E. Roth. 2006. “What will be needed for the new GI 
fellowship match to succeed?” Gastroenterology, 130, (January):  218-224. 
Niederle, Muriel, Deborah D. Proctor, and Alvin E. Roth. 2008. “The Gastroenterology Fellowship 
Match – The First Two Years,” Gastroenterology, 135, 2 (August): 344-346. 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth. 2003. “Relationship Between Wages and Presence of a Match in 
Medical Fellowships,” JAMA. Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 290, No. 9, (September 
3):  1153-1154. 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth. 2003. “Effect of a Match on Salaries for Medical Fellows—Reply,” 
JAMA. Journal of the American Medical Association;  290, No. 18, (November 12):  2408. 20 
 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth. 2003. “Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market:  
Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match,” Journal of Political Economy, 111, 6, 
(December): 1342-1352. 
Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. 2005. “Re-starting the Gastroenterology Match,” American 
Journal of Gastroenterology, 100, 5, (May):  1202-1203. 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth.2005.“The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should there be 
a Match?,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, (May):  372-375. 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. “The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job placement, 
Wages, and Hiring Practices”, in Labor Market Intermediation, David Autor, Editor,  The University of 
Chicago Press: 273-306 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. “Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers 
Affect Market Performance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1, 2, (August):  199-219. 
Niederle, Muriel and Leeat Yariv, 2009. “Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences”, working 
paper. 
Ockenfels, Axel and Alvin E. Roth. 2006. “Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: 
Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction” Games and Economic 
Behavior, 55:  297-320.  
Petak, Lisa Faye. 2010. “Young Lawyers Turn to Public Service,” NY Times, (August 19): 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/us/20defer.html?hpw . 
Priest, George L. 2010. “Timing ‘Disturbances’ in Labor Market Contracting: Roth’s Findings and the 
Effects of Labor Market Monopsony,” Journal of Labor Economics, 28, 2:  447-472. 
Rampell, Catherine. 2010. “The Other Law School Arms Race,”NY Times Economix Blog, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/the-other-law-school-arms-race/?dbk . 
Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. 
Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, Oleh G. Pankewycz, Janet Hiller, Alvin E. Roth, Tuomas Sandholm, Utku Ünver, 
and Robert A. Montgomery. 2009. “A Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chain,” New 
England Journal of Medicine, 360;11, (March 12):  1096-1101. 
Roth, Alvin E. 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case 
Study in Game Theory", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 92:  991-1016. 
Roth, AlvinE. 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals:  A General Property of 
Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Vol. 54:  425-427.  
Roth, A.E. 1990. "New Physicians:  A Natural Experiment in Market Organization," Science, 250:  1524-
1528. 
Roth, A.E.  1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets:  Regional 
Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.", American Economic Review, vol. 81, (June): 21 
 
415-440. 
Roth, A.E. and X. Xing. 1997.  "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing:  Decentralized 
Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, 105, (April): 284-329. 
Roth, Alvin E. 2002. “The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and 
Computation as Tools of Design Economics,” Econometrica, 70, 4, (July): 1341-1378. 
Roth, Alvin E.  2003. “The origins, history, and design of the resident match,” JAMA. Journal of the 
American Medical Association, vol. 289, No. 7, (February 19): 909-912. 
Roth, Alvin E. 2008. "What have we learned from market design?" Economic Journal, 118 (March): 
285–310. 
Roth, Alvin E. 2008. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," 
International Journal of Game Theory, Special Issue in Honor of David Gale on his 85
th birthday, 36, 
(March):  537-569.                                                                                                     
Roth, Alvin E. and Elliott Peranson. 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American 
Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design,” American Economic Review, 89, 4, 
(September):  748-780. 
Roth, Alvin E. and Axel Ockenfels. 2002. “Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price 
Auctions:  Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet,” American Economic Review, 
92 (4), (September): 1093-1103.  
Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver. 2004. "Kidney Exchange," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 119, 2, (May):  457-488. 
Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver. 2005a. “Pairwise Kidney Exchange,” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 125, 2, (December): 151-188.  
Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Utku Ünver. 2005b. “A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New 
England,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, (May):  376-380. 
Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver. 2007.  “Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of 
Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences,” American Economic Review,  97, 3, (June):  
828-851. 
Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver, Francis L. Delmonico, and Susan L. Saidman. 2006. 
“Utilizing List Exchange and Undirected Good Samaritan Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney 
Donations,” American Journal of Transplantation, 6, 11, (November): 2694-2705. 
Roth, Alvin E. and Xiaolin Xing. 1994. "Jumping the Gun:  Imperfections and Institutions Related to 
the Timing of Market Transactions,"  American Economic Review, 84, (September):  992-1044. 
Saidman, Susan L., Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver, and Francis L. Delmonico. 2006. 
“Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation By Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges,” 
Transplantation, 81, 5, (March 15): 773-782. 22 
 
Sloan, Karen. 2010. “Clerkship scramble,” National Law Journal, October 18, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202473438279&Clerkship_scramble&slreturn=1&
hbxlogin=1  
Unver, M. Utku. 2001. "Backward Unraveling over Time: The Evolution of Strategic Behavior in the 
Entry-Level British Medical Labor Markets" Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2001), 25 (6-
7): 1039-1080   
 